

Defense

6 APR 1977

Dear Frank,

Thanks very much for your words of congratulations on my appointment. As surprised as I am at being here, I am delighted and am thoroughly enjoying it.

I also very much appreciate your evaluations of the strengths and weaknesses of the Community. From what I have seen so far, I am in thorough agreement with you. One point that you raised which interested me particularly is that of improving dissemination through the more imaginative use of modern technical processes. I think in both the areas of analysis and disseminations we need more imaginative research. If you have any particular thoughts of processes we might be exploring I would be grateful to receive them.

In the meantime, I hope we can visit one of these days, but thanks very much again.

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy


Mr. F. P. Shaw
Deputy Director, Regional Programs
Office of the Director, Planning
and Evaluation
Department of Defense
Room 2E334, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Washington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. F. P. Shaw
Deputy Director, Regional Programs
Office of the Director, Planning and Evaluation

SUBJECT : Strengths and Weaknesses of the Intelligence Community

1. Thank you for the kind words in your 10 March memorandum. It was also good to receive your comments on the general strengths and weaknesses of the Intelligence Community. One of our priority tasks is to understand better the evolving needs of major users of intelligence and, as such, we welcome each opportunity to learn of your current views in this regard.
2. Your compliments and criticisms regarding intelligence support generally reinforce the principal findings of the Intelligence Community Staff's "Assessment of National Foreign Intelligence Production" prepared for the National Security Council in December 1976. Based in part on these findings, actions are underway to improve our estimative intelligence efforts and force capabilities analyses. We are also taking steps to address major, long-standing problems in the indications and warning (I&W) intelligence arena, including the development of an I&W plan to coordinate better the operation of the several Community components during crisis situations so as to optimize our support to the National Command Authority.
3. In addition, I share your view that the routine dissemination of intelligence to users requires continuing attention. We must do a better job of controlling and integrating the large volume of information received from our diverse collection systems. I have no doubt that we can make improvements Community-wide for more effective automated support to our analysts and, ultimately, to the consumer.
4. Thank you again for providing me your thoughts on these important matters.



STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

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
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, PLANNING AND EVALUATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
10 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Dear Stan,

Congratulations on your new appointment. I have but one reservation about it, I hope it does not remove you from consideration for further important military positions. We need help there, too.

I expect that you will not lack for advice about how to run things. However, you may find useful some impressions from here of the strengths and weaknesses of the intelligence community in general. As you know, we are heavy users of the product, both basic data and evaluated intelligence.

On the strength side:

Collection is excellent, especially so in those areas covered by advanced technical means.

Factual, direct reporting of military information is generally good, such as order of battle, unit location and equipment.

Technical intelligence is excellent, especially of weapons characteristics and capabilities.

Reporting of individual events, political and military is good.

On the weak side:

Analytical work in general, and estimative intelligence in particular, need improvement. Admittedly, this is the toughest of all to do well but is the most important to policy makers.

Evaluation of enemy unit and force capabilities is a perennial problem. We still find it difficult to determine what military units can accomplish under combat conditions. The readiness, mobilization and movement capabilities of forces are subject to great uncertainty.



Evaluation of friendly force capabilities. This is the same set of problems but frequently we know more about the enemy than our friends.

Indications intelligence needs expansion, automation and integration. Our problem of coming to grips with the unreinforced or surprise attack in Europe might be easier if we understood better the impact of such an event on enemy forces in other parts of the globe.

Dissemination to those who should be using good intelligence needs attention. Too often policy users substitute their own opinions for lack of knowledge. The product needs to be more accessible, perhaps through more imaginative use of modern technical processes.

These few and admittedly briefly explained thoughts suggest some reordering of priorities and possibly adjustment of resources away from collection and toward evaluation and dissemination. I hope they may be of some use to you.

Best wishes and good luck.



F. P. SHAW
Deputy Director
Regional Programs

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